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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the endogenous formation of technology sharing part-
nerships, or coalitions, in industries with a limited number of rms. In terms of
the treatment in competition policy cases, R&D mergers or Research Joint Ven-
tures (RJVs) are treated as exception from the prohibition of cooperation (e.g.,
Article 81 in EU Treaty of Rome which deals with agreements among rms,
and the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 in the U.S.). In particular,
the European Commission has issued guidelines on the applicability of Article
81 of the EC Treaty to horizontal cooperation that encompasses R&D cooper-
ation, and acknowledge that such cooperations may have signicant economic
benets through risk sharing, cost savings and the ability to launch new technolo-
gies faster than without such cooperation.1 RJVs can take various forms, ranging
from simple information sharing arrangements with non-cooperative investment
decisions by separate R&D units, to fully integrated R&D units where investment
decisions are made to maximize joint prots. A primary reason for the benevolent
treatment of RJVs is that there is a public good aspect to R&D which may make it
difcult to achieve socially optimal levels of R&D activity if focusing exclusively
on non-cooperative R&D. A major determinant in forming RJVs is the develop-
ment of new technologies that in turn may reduce production costs. Although
allowing the formation of a RJV does not directly affect the market structure in
the nal product market, efciency effects from the RJV may have an impact on
the market share of the participating rms with increasing dominance as a result.2
An important aspect of public policy with respect to R&D in many countries
is the focus on how to increase R&D levels to the OECD average.3 Although
this is a useful starting point, the total level of R&D is not necessarily the most
appropriate measure of success as the characteristics of the R&D intensive indus-
1See Commission Notice, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
horizontal cooperation agreements, 2001/C 3/02), and in particular, Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2659/2000 of 29 November 2000, on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories
of research and development agreements.
2See Gugler and Siebert (2007) for an extensive overview of the literature, and for evidence on
market power versus efciency effects on mergers and RJVs.
3The Norwegian government has discussed this in a White Paper: St. Prp 51 (2002-2003)
Virkemidler for et innovativt og nyskapende næringsliv (Innovasjonsmeldingen).
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tries also matter. The present analysis is exclusively focused on rms' privately
nanced R&D investments, and we do not look at R&D undertaken and nanced
by public funds. Consequently, the R&D levels we observe in the context of the
present model is only half the picture. As we show below, the equilibrium co-
alition outcome is the least desirable outcome if the main objective is to increase
R&D investments. This would imply that if competition policy authorities allow
such a coalition to go through, the public sector will need to nance an even larger
share of the total R&D investments to achieve a higher level of investments. This
may quite possibly be seen as good news for universities and research institutes.
We consider a simple type of R&D cooperation, and focus on coalition form-
ation with technology sharing in a static game. By this we mean that coalition
partners benet fully from any technological advancements that their partner un-
dertakes, but the investment decisions are taken non-cooperatively. There is no
benet of the R&D undertaken by the coalition partners for the rm outside the ar-
rangement. Thus, there is perfect spillover within the coalition and zero spillover
to the outsider. This set-up could also be interpreted as one in which patent hold-
ers enter into a patent pool, with each member of the pool being allowed to (cost-
lessly) utilise cost reducing technology advancements made by their partners.4
The endogenous formation of the coalition, or pool, will then determine the scope
of the pool (i.e., how many, if any, pool partners will there be). There is also some
resemblance to the literature on open source, which by some authors is termed
collective invention.5 The sharing of technology advancements in the present ana-
lysis also bears some resemblance to the theory of club goods, where the members
of the club can benet from all the facilities of the club.6
There are three rms in our model that all have different ex ante levels of mar-
ginal cost in producing the nal product. The rms undertake R&D investments
which we model as a type of process innovation, where the investments reduce
the marginal cost (of producing the nal product) for both the investing rms and
4For analysis of the welfare effects of patent pools in a different setting see Lerner and Tirole
(2004).
5On open source see, e.g., Lerner and Tirole (2005). The term collective invention is often
attributed to Allen (1983) and describes "the free exchange of information about new techniques
and plant designs among rms in an industry".
6Buchanan (1965) is the seminal article on the theory of club goods.
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that of its coalition partners.7 The type of R&D undertaken should be thought of
in terms of implementation of new technology rather than the discovery of new
processes, since there is no uncertainty with respect to the outcome of the R&D
investment. The three rms compete in quantities in the product market, and we
assume that there is no cooperation other than the potential to share technological
advancements among coalition partners. The R&D investments undertaken by co-
alition members are thought of as complementary, so each unit of cost-reducing
R&D by rm A in the coalition can be added to each unit of cost-reducing R&D
by rm B. The specication of the cost function, with the effect of R&D on costs
and the ex ante asymmetry between rms allow us to shed light on the distri-
butional effect across rms on R&D expenditure of forming technology sharing
coalitions. This is contrary to the focus on total R&D expenditure maintained by
the majority of the literature.
Related Literature
We focus on the potential outcomes of either coalitions with two rms, the case
with no coalition, and the monopoly (or grand) coalition with all rms particip-
ating. In addition, we rank the various outcomes in terms of impact on industry
prot, consumers' surplus and ultimately on welfare. Although our primary fo-
cus is not on mergers, we make use of the methodology developed by Horn and
Persson (2001) to characterize the equilibrium coalition structure and to invest-
igate the impact on R&D investment levels of the potential outcomes. A similar
set of criteria to determine the equilibrium market structure is also employed by
Barros (1998) in a paper on endogenous mergers.8 None of these papers consider
efciency enhancing investments which is the case for the present paper.
The equilibrium coalition is a result of a cooperative bargaining process in
which rms can communicate freely with each other and are free to write bind-
ing contracts with each other (Horn and Persson, 2001). There are other papers
7Some stylised facts on what is termed "informal knowhow sharing" in various industries can
be found in von Hippel (1987). Carter (1989) investigates the economic incentives behind sharing
of technical information.
8Vasconcelos (2006) considers endogeous mergers in endogenous sunk cost industries to derive
upper bounds on concentration.
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that investigate merger formation, and the three main paths to analysing endo-
genous mergers are: i) Model the process as a normal form game with bids and
asking prices (Kamien and Zang, 1990, 1991), ii) Merger formation as a non-
cooperative bargaining process (Chatterjee et al., 1993, and Ray and Vohra, 1999),
and iii) Merger formation as a cooperative game (Horn and Persson, 2001). The
present paper follows the third approach. In this methodology, the focus is on
the outcome of the merger process rather than the process that leads to the ulti-
mate coalition. Firms are free to enter into cooperative arrangements with others,
and may also attempt to break up existing coalitions. Intuitively, the ultimate co-
alition will be such that all participating rms gain more than at the outset and
that no non-participating rm can offer any of the coalition members a more at-
tractive proposition.9 Goyal and Moraga-Gonzáles (2001) consider the incentives
for forming pairwise, non-exclusive collaborative R&D arrangements, and their
model allows for a rich set of possible collaborations. The degree of rm rivalry
is essential in explaining which collaboration will prevail, and it is suggested that
high degree of competition may lead to excessive incentives to collaborate. The
analysis in the present paper follows the coalitions approach, in which one player
can only belong to one group.
Previous literature indicates that practical use of the endogenous merger meth-
odology necessarily requires some major simplifying assumptions. Banal-Estanol
et al. (2008) consider coalition formation between three identical managers who
can make cost-reducing investments that are either zero or an exogenously xed
constant level. The emphasis is on the interplay between the merger and invest-
ment decisions, and the aim is to shed light on why some mergers fail to real-
ise efciency gains. The paper consequently extends the literature on horizontal
mergers by endogenising the efciency gains. A similar approach is taken by
Bartolini (2008) who considers the interplay between cost reduction and merger
strategy. Firms are ex ante identical, they face a binary investment decision of
acquiring a cost-reducing asset or not, and after the investment decision is taken
rms may merge (or form coalitions) to change the market structure. Firms then
compete in quantities in the product market according to the market structure that
materialises. The investment decision affects the potential synergies of a mer-
9Details are discussed in Section 8.
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ger, and there is no synergy if not at least one of the merging rms has invested.
The trade-off facing rms when deciding on whether to enter into a coalition is
between the positive externality effect of joining a coalition (termed the "Stieg-
ler effect") and the negative externality effect (synergy effect). The rst effect
provides rms incentives to stay out of the coalition when competing in quantit-
ies, but when considering the cost saving effect of being part of the coalition it
may induce rms to enter a coalition when the cost is high relative to the size of
the market. Without the synergy effect (i.e., no investment), we are essentially
in the same scenario as Ray and Vohra (1997) and Bloch (1996) and the grand
coalition (monopoly) would form. Our analysis seeks to extend the current literat-
ure to investigate asymmetric rms and contrary to the papers by Bartolini (2008)
and Banal-Estanol et al. (2008), we assume ex ante asymmetric rms and also
endogenise the size of the efciency investment (through process innovation).
Methodologically, our work is related to Straume (2006). In considering endo-
genous merger between three asymmetric rms, Straume (2006) nds it necessary
to restrict the type of asymmetry between rms to be symmetrically distributed.
The focus in his paper is on how the internal organisation of the rm, specically
through managerial delegation, affects the incentives to merge in exogenously
asymmetric industries. The present paper differs from Straume (2006) in that we
consider endogenous coalition formation with both ex ante asymmetric rms and
endogenous cost-reducing investments. Belleamme (2000) demonstrates that the
formation of a grand coalition in endogenous merger models is critically depend-
ent upon the assumption of symmetric rms. In a cost-reduction model in which
rms are asymmetric and compete in quantities in the product market, he obtains
results for coalition formation based upon the simplifying assumption that only
two types of coalition are possible. Similarly, extensions of d'Aspremont and Jac-
quemin's (1988) seminal work on R&D incentives to the case of asymmetric rms
has required some major simplifying assumptions. For example, Halmenschlager
(2004) considers R&D cooperation in a model with asymmetric rms where two
high-cost rms face a technological leader. The latter rm does not engage in
R&D, so the question posed is under which conditions the laggards can gain from
sharing R&D. In the current paper we use the endogenous merger methodology
to look at the sharing of and endogenous level of complementary R&D between
rms with different levels of efciency. In the light of our previous discussion,
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the level of ambition here is tempered by what is practically possible. As such we
adopt the same assumption on asymmetry as in Straume (2006) in assuming that
the initial cost difference between rms is symmetrically distributed. Whilst this
leads to a stylised model, we postulate that the phenomena and mechanisms that
we identify will have wider applicability. The R&D market game that arises from
each coalition structure can easily be solved for the general case, but identify-
ing the coalition that fullls the conditions for being the endogenous equilibrium
structure is not possible.
One main feature of the approach of Horn and Persson (2001) is that the
lack of restrictions on the contracts between coalition partners implies that the
free-riding problem becomes less pronounced, and one would expect the solution
for the equilibrium market structure to become more efcient. In a three rm
model with cost asymmetry, we show that the equilibrium coalition may either be
between the two most efcient rms, or the grand coalition with all rms. It is not
necessarily obvious that the most efcient (and hence) largest rms would choose
to share their technology advancements. Our model predicts a result along the
line of "keep your friends close, but your enemies closer". One might initially be
tempted to deduce that the more efcient rm would prefer to go into partnership
with the least efcient rm, or that the two least efcient rms would join forces
to be able to outcompete the ex ante most efcient rm. This, however, turns out
not to be the case here. The three-rm coalition will emerge as the equilibrium
structure when the potential for innovation is low and the cost of investment high.
This is reasonable since rms would want to invest less, and the grand coalition
results in the lowest level of total R&D. In addition, the analysis of mergers often
reveals conicting interests between social and private merger incentives. This is,
in particular, due to the fact that the mergers that are chosen endogenously are mer-
gers that result in high industry prot, which is often deemed to be incompatible
with high consumers' surplus. In the present analysis, however, the endogenously
chosen coalition is also the coalition that maximizes welfare and the coalition that
achieves the highest industry prot is also the coalition that results in the highest
total output. The important distinction to traditional mergers is naturally that in
the present paper we analyse research cooperation, which has the efciency effect
without the increasing concentration effect.
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Our approach is related to that of endogenous spillovers in that the forma-
tion of a coalition has implications for spillovers between rms. By agreeing to
join a coalition with one or two competitors, the partners implicitly agree to share
technology advancements. This is similar in many respects to rms deciding how
much of the technology advancements should be transferred to rival rms (i.e.,
how large is the spillover parameter chosen to be). The importance of the de-
gree of spillover for innovative activity is studied by numerous authors (see, e.g.,
De Bondt, 1997, for an overview). Gil Molto et al. (2005) analyse a situation
where rms endogenously choose the design of the R&D process, where more
compatible R&D technologies leads to higher degrees of spillover. Related to this
is also the literature on absorptive capacity and spillovers, with Kamien and Zang
(2000) and Wiethaus (2005) as examples of this avenue of research. The main
idea there is that rms choose (endogenously) R&D approaches, idiosyncratic
or broad approaches, which again have implications for the degree of spillovers.
These papers come to different conclusions with respect to the choice of R&D
approaches by competing rms. Furthermore, if the rms undertaking R&D can
protect their inventions by the use of some kind of patent protection, this is also in
effect a way of limiting the degree of spillover from the investing rm to its rivals.
This is analysed in, e.g., Milliou (2009). The present analysis is also comple-
mentary to Kabiraj and Mukherjee (2000). They consider a three-rm game with
quantity competititon, with the product market cooperation being endogenously
chosen. For cooperation in R&D, they consider both knowledge sharing and Re-
search Joint Venture, but only two rms are allowed to cooperate. They consider
the effect of allowing cooperation at the R&D stage on the incentives to merge
at the production stage, and how mergers at the production stage may affect the
organisation of the R&D cooperation. Contrary to the present apporach, rms are
ex ante symmetric and only two of the rms are capable of doing R&D.
In spite of this, technology sharing can potentially have competition effects,
and hence we look at our conclusions from the theoretical model in the light of
EU competition law, and a case study from aircraft engine manufacturing. Whilst
we nd support for the type of technology sharing that we are considering, and
document that this may well be required by law, there is a discrepancy between
our prediction for the equilibrium coalition and our observations from the case
study. Hence, it would appear that competition law prevents the type of coalition
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structures that would appear endogenously, given the market structure, due to the
effect of limiting the potential competition.
Our theoretical result depends on the balance between a free-riding effect and
efciency effects within the coalition, and although the market structure in the
product market is unaffected by the various coalitions, the aggressivity of com-
petition in the product market may be affected. A seminal contribution on the
effect of industry structure on the level of innovation is Dasgupta and Stiglitz
(1980). In their paper they treat both industry structure and the nature of the in-
novative activity as endogenous, and they construct a theoretical model consistent
with empirical facts that does not make assumption about causality between con-
centration and innovation. Similarly, Vickers (1986) investigates the relationship
between the evolution of market structure and R&D with sequential, non-drastic
innovations.10 The innovative process is modelled as a sequence of patent races.
The main question posed is what determines whether an industry becomes in-
creasingly dominated by one rm, or whether market leadership changes between
rms over time. His main result suggests that the intensity of the product market
competition determines whether there is increasing dominance, or changing mar-
ket leadership. If the product market is highly competitive (Bertrand-competition)
there is increasing dominance, but when competition in the product market is less
intense (Cournot) then there may be changing market leadership over time as the
increase in potential product market prot increases the incentives to undertake
cost-reducing R&D. A more recent contribution on the relationship between the
product market competition and innovation is Aghion et al. (2005). Innovation
incentives depend in their model on the difference between pre-innovation and
post-innovation rents, and if competition reduces a rm's pre-innovation rents
more than it reduces post-innovation rents increased competition may lead to in-
creased innovation. The theoretical model predicts an inverted-U shaped rela-
tionship between competition and innovation, and the empirical analysis nds
evidence for such a relationship. Röller, Siebert and Tombak (2007) analyse in-
centives to form RJVs by estimating an endogenous switching model using U.S.
data. They also construct a theoretical model for RJV formation with asymmetric
10Related to this is Reinganum (1985) who considers sequential, drastic innovations, and shows
that the market at any given time is monopolised by the rm that most recently made the innovation.
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rms, but their approach is different to ours in three important aspects in that they
only consider a duopoly, rms in an RJV coordinate their investment and share
R&D costs, and nally as a consequence of only considering a duopoly they do
not consider endogenous RJV formation. Some of their main empirical ndings
are that cost-sharing is an important incentive for RJV formation, and that RJVs
tend to be formed among rms of similar size. The former effect is absent in the
present analysis, and could strengthen the incentives to form RJVs, and the latter
is consistent with the theoretical predictions of the present analysis.
The present paper is also related to the literature on the sharing of private
cost and demand information in oligopolies, notably Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1985,
1986), Shapiro (1986), Vives (1984), and Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite and Su-
zumura (1990). Whereas these papers consider the exchange of information in
asymmetric information models which affects the rms' perception of the com-
petition, the present analysis is concerned with exchange of information that dir-
ectly affects the marginal cost of production of the partners to a coalition. The
link is, as pointed out by Eaton and Eswaran (1997), that the information that is
exchanged is in both cases non-rivalrous. Eaton and Eswaran (1997) show in the
context of a supergame that trading of technical information can be sustained as
an equilibrium. The mechanism to sustain sharing is through punishments (ejec-
tion from the coalition if providing empty information). The trading of technical
information may reduce the marginal cost of production for the partners of a co-
alition in a similar way to the present analysis, but in Eaton and Eswaran (1997)
rms have ex ante identical marginal cost of production, which implies that all
rms in a coalition have identical marginal cost when all relevant information is
traded in the coalition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the basic
model and the non-coalition outcome. In section 3, 4, 5, and 6 we analyze the
four possible coalition structures. In section 7 we compare the R&D investment
levels under the different technology sharing coalitions, and in section 8 we en-
dogenise the coalition formation. In section 9 we look at welfare aspects of the
different coalitions, in section 10 we look at antitrust policy and research cooper-
ation, in section 11 we consider a case study of aircraft engine manufacturing, and
in section 10 we make some concluding remarks.
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2 The Benchmark Model
There are three rms 1;2 and 3 who produce a homogeneous product for which






where p is the product price, and qi is the quantity produced by rm i= 1;2;3.
The initial marginal production cost faced by each rm is ci = ic where c> 0 and
hence gives a direct measure of cost asymmetry in the industry. At stage 1, each
rm has the possibility of investing in R&D in order to reduce this marginal cost;
the cost of R&D is the same for each rm: k(xi) =
γx2i
2 , where xi is the amount of
R&D undertaken by rm i and γ is a constant parameter. Marginal cost is affected
by R&D in the following way:
bci = ic  xi (2)
where bci is post R&D cost for rm i.11 We assume initially that there are no
spillovers from one rm's investment to the others. At stage 2 the rms compete
in quantities in the product market. The coalition partners operate as a form of
RJV in which the partners share their technology advancements perfectly, but they
choose both quantity and R&D spending non-cooperatively. There is no sharing
of R&D costs, and the only effect of a coalition is sharing of improved techno-
logy through spillovers which reduces costs of producing the nal product. In the
11In a previous version we have worked with a more general asymmetric situation. In particular,
the ex post marginal cost has been formulated as follows: bca = θac xa for the post R&D marginal
cost without a coalition, and bci ji = θ ic  xi  x j is the post R&D cost for rm i when in a coalition
between rms i and j, and bci jk = θ kc  xk is the post R&D cost for the outsider. Although this is a
more general approach, the results with respect to the various technology sharing arrangements do
not change qualitatively. In addition, we are not able to solve for the equilibrium coalition, which is
an important part of the current paper. Hence, we focus on the simplied approach from the outset.
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terminology of Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992) we analyse RJVs with compet-
ition. In contrast to the majority of the literature on strategic R&D investments
where there typically are imperfect spillovers between investing rms, we con-
sider a setting with either zero or perfect spillovers.12 The introduction of ex ante
asymmetric rms, which is not a common feature in models of strategic R&D
investments, necessitates such a simplication of the model to make the model
and analysis tractable. One effect of this simplication is that it accentuates the
free-rider effect on investment incentives.
The rms that enter into a coalition enjoy perfect spillovers, whereas the out-
sider can only improve on own costs through his own investments. The R&D
activities of the coalition partners are by the perfect spillover assumption con-
sidered as perfectly complementary activities. In a number of different RJVs the
R&D undertaken by partner rms consists of developing either new technologies
or adopting existing technologies in different dimensions, although each partner
may have capabilities in all relevant dimensions. One example of this, is aircraft
engine manufacturing which will be addressed in more detail below, where two of
the three major manufacturers formed a joint venture to develop a new engine (the
partners are General Electric and Pratt-Whitney). Any new technology developed
during the course of this joint project can be utilised in other engine programmes.
It is therefore reasonable that there is a spillover effect from the joint venture to
other products manufactured by each of the partners. In the semiconductor in-
dustry, Gugler and Siebert (2007) nd evidence for efciency gains from forming
RJVs. This is in particular true in the microcomponents segment of the industry,
where each of the rms participating in the RJV can achieve up to a 15% increase
in its market share. This suggests that there may be a substantial spillover effect
on costs by joining a RJV.
We assume the existence of an upper and a lower bound on c in order to
ensure existence of equilibrium for each of the market games that we consider:
c > c > c.13 The upper bound ensures that each rm is willing to invest in R&D
12The seminal paper on strategic R&D investments is d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). Sim-
ilar issues are analysed by Suzumura (1992), Leahy and Neary (1997), and Brod and Shivakumar
(1997).
13These bounds depend upon γ: c = 2 γ6(1 γ) and c =
2(2γ 3)
8γ2 17γ 3 . This interval is dened for the
range of γ > 5 that we consider.
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in equilibrium, and the lower bound guarantees that ex post marginal cost is al-
ways positive. To be able to focus on endogenous coalition formation, we need
at least three active rms. This implies that we need to restrict our attention to
interior equilibria. Existence of an interior equilibrium for the different coalition
cases hold for different sets of parameter values. In order to be able to make a
comparison between the cases, we must take this into account and impose the
restrictions that encompass the various equilibria that are investigated. The para-
meter space which ensures existence for the case in which the most efcient rms
cooperate is encompassed by that of all other cases, and hence the equilibria exist
collectively for c> c> c. In addition, we need to impose the restriction that γ > 5
to ensure existence of all equilibria we consider.
To determine the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game we work
backwards from stage 2, assuming that the rms act non-cooperatively at each
stage. The maximization problem of rm i is
max
qi
π i = (1  (qi+q j+qk)  ic+ xi)qi (3)
where i; j;k = 1;2;3; i 6= j 6= k.
Given the amount of R&D undertaken at stage 1, the quantity produced by











giving rm i a prot of π i = q2i in the product market. Firm i thus chooses its
amount of R&D to solve the following problem:
max
xi





conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
The non-cooperative level of R&D by each rm in an interior equilibrium can










X = x1+ x2+ x3 =
9(1 2c)
(8γ 3)
where the second-order condition for each player's maximization and the stability
condition is fullled for γ > 32 which is the case given the general restriction placed
on γ , with γ > 5. Hence the sign of the denominator in (6) is positive.14 The
rst order conditions for the maximization of (5) yield the following relationship
between quantity and R&D of rm i= 1;2;3: qi = 2γ3 xi:It is immediately apparent
from (4) and (6) that q1> q2> q3 and x1> x2> x3 so that the most efcient rm at
the outset (rm 1) does the most R&D and produces the most output in the interior
equilibrium. This is may appear contrary to the result of Vickers (1986) when
considering Cournot with a (single) patent race. However, the catching-up effect
that can be observed in his analysis is partly due to the fact that the innovation is
not sufciently substantial, partly due to the fact that only the winner of the patent
race in his model achieves a cost reduction, and partly due to the fact that the
winner may end up monopolising the market. In the present analysis, we restrict
our attention to the case where all rms are active, and in which all rms invest
positive amounts in cost-reducing R&D. Consequently, all rms achieve some
level of cost reduction, which implies that the gain from investing more for the ex
ante less efcient rm is not as strong as in Vickers (1986). To sum up:
Proposition 1 In the non-cooperative benchmark case, the most efcient rm
ex ante undertakes the highest level of R&D, produces the highest level of output
14On the stability condition in oligopoly models in general see Seade (1980). For their use in
R&D models see Henriques (1990).
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and earns the highest level of prot, and the least efcient rm ex ante under-
takes the lowest level of R&D and earns the lowest level of prot in an interior
equilibrium.





(xi)2 for i= 1;2;3 (7)
where Π1 > Π2 > Π3 in equilibrium. The proportionality factor γ(8γ 9)18 is
strictly positive for all permissible values of γ .
The difference in the R&D of two rms that are adjacent in terms of cost, say




so that the difference in R&D is proportional to the difference in ex ante ef-
ciency.15 The relationship for the ex post costs of these two rms is consequently:
bc2 bc1 = (2c  x2)  (c  x1) = 2γc2γ 3  αc (9)
where the proportionality coefcient α is the same for the comparison
between adjacent rms 1 and 2, and 2 and 3. Since α > 1, there is a larger
relative distance between the rms' marginal cost after R&D takes place.
Corollary 1 The difference in the level of R&D undertaken is proportional to
the difference in ex ante marginal cost of production. This implies that the differ-
ence in ex post marginal cost of production increases after R&D is undertaken.
In the non-cooperative case, R&D serves to exacerbate existing cost differ-
ences between the rms.
15The ex ante difference in costs is c.
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3 Technology Sharing between the Most Efcient Firms
We now suppose that the two most efcient rms, 1 and 2, agree to share the res-
ults of their independent R&D in the form of a technology sharing consortium.
Each rm still decides how much to spend on R&D independently of the others,
but 1 and 2 now get the full benet of each others' advancement. The cost re-
ducing R&D can be thought of as complementary R&D. There is, as before, no
spillover to or from the outside rm 3. Hence the ex post marginal production
costs of the rms are given by
bc121 = c  x121   x122 (10)bc122 = 2c  x121   x122bc123 = 3c  x123
where bc12i indicates the marginal cost post of R&D expenditures of rm i =
1;2;3 given that 1 and 2 share technology advancements.
The prot levels of the rms before the R&D stage are given by
Π121 =
 






















The interior R&D expenditures in equilibrium are then
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where the denominator in these expressions is positive by the stability condi-
tion.16
From (11) one can compute that x121   x122 = cγ > 0 from which it is apparent
that x121 > x122 for all permissible values of γ . Hence the rm that is most efcient
initially will undertake more R&D than the less efcient partner, but since all
technology advancements are shared among the coalition partners the gap in the
R&D levels of the two inside rms is smaller than in the no-coalition case (see
(8)).
In all of the coalition cases that we consider, there is a simple relationship
between quantities, total prots, and R&D expenditure in equilibrium. Suppose
that two rms (call them i and j) cooperate on R&Dwhilst rm k is outside. Then
equilibrium quantities and total prot in equilibrium are easily determined to be:
qi ji = γx
i j
i (12)







16Stability requires only that γ > 1:678, and this i satised for the general restriction we have
placed on γ > 5.
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The following proposition then follows.
Proposition 2 i) When the two most efcient rms enter into a coalition, the
most efcient partner invests more than the less efcient partner. Due to perfect
spillover between the partners the difference in ex post marginal costs are lower
than the case with no coalition. ii) The coalition partners enjoy a larger efciency
advantage over the outsider. iii) The outsider may, if the proportionality para-
meter c is sufciently low and investment cost is sufciently high, invest more in
R&D than the insiders' individual R&D investments.
In Figure 1, parameter combinations that satisfy c > c > c are in the area
between A and B, and this area is divided up into three sub-areas.17 Note that
γ = 5 is the lowest value of the cost parameter for which all equilibria exist. In
the largest of these (I), the ranking of R&D by each rm is the same as in the
benchmark case: x121 > x122 > x123 > 0. In area II we have that x121 > x123 > x122 > 0
whilst in III it is the least effective rm (the outsider) that has the most R&D:
x123 > x121 > x122 > 0.
Since rms 1 and 2 share the results of their R&D, the relative difference in
their efciency levels is also preserved ex post. The difference in ex post marginal
cost for the coalition partners is simply the ex ante difference given by c; further-
more, it can be shown that the difference in ex post marginal costs between the
coalition partners is lower than in the benchmark case of no coalition. The partner
17The equations of all curves denoted by letters in gures are given in Appendix 1.
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Figure 1: Coalition between the two most efcient rms
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rms manage to gain an additional advantage over the outsider if the sum of their




k when rms i and j
are in a coalition and rm k is the outsider. This is the case in the equilibrium
discussed here. Hence, the technology sharing arrangement between the two most
efcient rms serves to further disadvantage the less efcient rival. In this respect,
this coalition with perfect spillovers tends towards increasing dominance (to use
Vickers' terminology). What is also apparent is the fact that the existence of a
technology sharing coalition affects the distribution of R&D across rivals in the
industry, and not only the total amount of R&D.
The intuition behind the results can be explained as follows: The R&D effort
of the two coalition partners are strategic complements due to perfect spillovers,
which lead to lower levels of investments for both the partners compared to the
no-coalition case (the free-riding effect). Furthermore, since spillovers are perfect
and the R&D costs are convex, the most efcient rm which invests the most
in the no-coalition case will face a stronger free-riding effect than the coalition
partner and will reduce its investment level more than its partner. This explains
why the difference in investment levels between rms 1 and 2 in the no-coalition
case is higher than in the coalition case. For the partners, the R&D effort of the
outsider is perceived as a strategic substitute to the partners' effort, and since the
coalition partners reduce their overall investment level due to the free-riding effect
this implies that the outsider invests more relative to the coalition partners than in
the benchmark case. The outsider, in this case rm 3, still invests less than in
the no-coalition case, but the difference in investment level relative to the second-





negative. Although the outsider invests more relative to the coalition partners,
which in isolation would tend towards equalisation of the industry, the fact that
there are perfect spillovers between the coalition partners implies that the effective
cost reduction of the coalition partners is greater than that of the outsider.
If allowing for less than perfect spillovers between the coalition partners, this
would ceteris paribus reduce the effective cost reduction and moderate the in-
creasing dominance effect. However, with less than perfect spillovers, the free-
riding effect would be less dominant and work in the opposite direction. The
overall effect on R&D activity when considering a more complex model is likely
to depend on the degree of product market competition (Aghion et al., 2005), but
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the majority of work in this avenue of research concentrates on total R&D and
not on the distribution of R&D as in the present paper. What seems to be robust
and consistent with empirical ndings (Röller et al., 2007), is the fact that rms
of equal size are more likely to form RJVs which is essentially what our later
equilibrium coalition analysis suggests.
4 Technology Sharing between the Most and Least Efcient Firms
Suppose now that rms 1 and 3 join together in the technology sharing arrange-
ment whilst 2 is outside the arrangement. Marginal costs after R&D are now given
by
bc131 = c  x131   x133 (14)bc133 = 3c  x131   x133bc132 = 2c  x132














and the quantities and prots follow (12) and (13). To sum up:
Proposition 3 i) When the most and the least efcient rms enter into a co-
alition, the outsider will invest more than the insiders if the proportionality para-
meter c is sufciently high. ii) Even with higher investment levels for the outsider,
the least efcient rm closes the gap on the outsider.
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The intuition behind these results are essentially the same as described above.
The outsider, rm j, has stronger incentives to invest in cost reducing R&D than
the insiders. This is due to the fact that the insiders face free-riding issues and
strategic complementarity between their investments, which reduces their invest-
ments and reduces the investment of the ex antemost efcient rmmost. Since the
insiders' investment and that of the outsider are strategic substitutes, the reduction
in the coalition partners' investments results in higher investment by the outsider.
The reason why the outsider may, for some parameter values, invest more than
the most efcient insider is that for some levels of the initial marginal cost, c, the
percentage reduction in ex post marginal cost due to R&D is sufciently large.
5 Coalition between the Two Least Efcient Firms
The nal possibility that we consider is one in which the least efcient rms, 2
and 3, agree to share the results of their R&D, with the most efcient rm outside
of the arrangement. Ex post costs are then















Again, equilibrium quantities and prots follow the pattern in (12) and (13),
the following result is easily veried.
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Proposition 4 i) When the two least efcient rms enter into a coalition, the ex
ante most efcient rm undertakes the highest level of R&D and the ex ante least
efcient rm provides the lowest level of R&D. ii) If the proportionality parameter
c is sufciently high, and above γ=(22γ 9), the gap in ex post efciency between
the coalition partners and the efcient outsider becomes larger. iii) If c is below
this level, the coalition partners will gain relative to the efcient outsider, but will
not catch up completely.
6 The Three-Firm Coalition
The nal possibility is a grand coalition involving all three rms. In this case ex
post costs are
bc1231 = c X123bc1232 = 2c X123bc1233 = 3c X123










The total level of R&D in this case is X123 = 3(1 2c)8γ 3 , which is one third of
the total non-cooperative R&D from equation (6). Since all three rms participate
in the coalition, there is no change in the relative competitiveness. Although all
three rms participate both the level of R&D and the output decisions are still
taken independently. From Bergstrom and Varian (1985) we know that the Nash
outcome of a class of games will be independent of the distribution of the rms'
characteristics. The total output in the nal stage is independent of the individual
rm's ex post marginal cost and depends only on the sum of the rms' ex post
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marginal costs, since Q = (3  (bc1+bc2+bc3))=4. This implies that it is not the
total R&D effort that matters, but the effective reduction in the sum of marginal
costs that results from the R&D activities. Since there are perfect spillovers within
a coalition which adds to the benet of R&D, the effective reduction in marginal
costs will depend on whether there is a coalition and which rms enter into a tech-
nology sharing coalition. In the case of the grand coalition the effective reduction
in a given rm's ex post marginal cost is
 
x1231 + x1232 + x1233

. In this case the free-
riding effect on each individual rm's R&D incentives is such that the reduction
in ex post marginal cost with the grand coalition and with no coalition is effect-
ively identical. Even if total R&D is lower the effective cost reduction for the
coalition members is high. The implication of this is that total output in the two
structures are identical, and that consumers are indifferent between no coalition
and the grand coalition.
7 Comparison of R&D Levels
In this section we look at the relative properties of the four cases considered. One
can determine that the relationship between the total amounts of R&D undertaken
is given by X > X23 > X13 > X12 > X123. For the most efcient rm we nd that
x1 > x231 > x121 > x131 > x1231 so that it undertakes the most R&D in the stand-alone
situation, and the least amount when all three rms enter into a coalition. Of the
cooperative solutions it conducts most R&D as an outsider to a technology sharing
partnership. For the intermediate rm the comparison is also straightforward:
x2 > x132 > x132 > x132 > x1232 . For the least efcient rm the comparison is partly
parameter specic. It is, however, unambiguously the case that x3> x123 , x133 > x233 ,
and x1233 < x233 . Furthermore when c is sufciently large18 then x123 > x133 .
To sum up:
Proposition 5 i) The total level of R&D is highest when there is no coalition,
lowest of the two-rm coalitions when the two most efcient rms enter into a
coalition, and lowest overall in the grand coalition: X >X23>X13>X12>X123.
18Specically c> γ(γ 3)6γ2+5γ 6 .
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ii) For the two most efcient rms, the level of R&D at rm level is higher as an
outsider than as an insider.
The level of the ex ante cost difference, c, plays an important role in the ana-
lysis as it is a measure of the asymmetry between the rms. The comparative
static results for R&D expenditures show that the equilibrium level of investment










for all h, where h denotes the type of coalition; h = f12;13;23;123g. Thus, the
most efcient rm will in all of the coalition cases increase expenditure on R&D
when the ex ante cost difference increases. This is also the case when rms oper-
ate without technology sharing arrangements. Since both quantity and prots are
proportional to R&D expenditure, the comparative statics with respect to changes
in c will have the same signs as (18). The reason for this seemingly counterintuit-
ive comparative statics results is due to the fact that when c increases rms become
more asymmetric ex ante, and our specication of the asymmetry between rms
implies that for each unit of increase in c the marginal cost of rm 2 increases
two-fold and for rm 3 the increase is three-fold. This implies that ex ante most
efcient rm enjoys a substantially larger percentage reduction in ex postmarginal
cost from any given R&D investment, and hence the results in (18).
8 Equilibrium Technology Sharing Arrangement
In order to establish which, if any, technology sharing arrangement would arise
endogenously, we need a solution concept that ensures both that each individual
coalition partner is at least as well of in the coalition as the best alternative out-
come, and that no outside rm can break the coalition. To break a coalition, the
www.economics-ejournal.org 25
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
breaking rm must be able to offer a more attractive prospect to one of the coali-
tion partners than is achieved as part of the coalition. A given rm can offer to
another rm any share of the prot it gains from entering into a particular agree-
ment. Each rm is restricted only by its own participation constraint, and any
side payment it deems necessary is allowed. The equilibrium coalition is a coali-
tion which is both internally and externally stable. This means that in equilibrium
no outsider nds it protable to offer an alternative deal to one of the insiders to
break the coalition, and the insiders earn at least the level of prot as in the best
alternative coalition. If one of the coalition partners leaves the coalition, then the
coalition breaks down and may be replaced with another coalition. In our setting
with only three players, a two rm coalition will naturally break up if one of the
rms depart and we are back in the no coalition scenario.
A coalition Ci is said to dominate another coalition C j if the combined prot
of the decisive coalition partners is larger in Ci than in C j. A decisive partner is
able to inuence which of the coalitions will be formed. In comparing any two-
rm coalition with another two-rm coalition, all three rms are decisive. Let
us consider, for example, the coalition consisting of rms 1 and 2 (C12), with a
coalition consisting of rms 2 and 3 (C23). All rms are decisive. The reason being
that if rm 3 is sufciently adversely affected by a coalition between 1 and 2, then
rm 3 may attempt to persuade rm 2, to enter into a coalition with 3 and break the
coalition between 1 and 2, by offering rm 2 a larger share than it receives inC12.
A similar argument can be made for the other constellations. When comparing
any two-rm coalition with the default outcome of no coalition, the outsider is
no longer decisive. To nd the structure that dominates involves comparing the
sum of the two coalition partners' prot in the coalition with the sum of their
prots without a coalition.19 The coalition structures that are undominated are the
equilibrium technology sharing arrangements.
This implies that the arrangement that yields the highest level of industry prot
will be the chosen coalition, provided that this structure awards the coalition part-
ners higher prot than the default outcome; i.e., the sum of prot for the coalition
partners in the absence of a technology sharing arrangement. This ensures that
19See Horn and Persson (2001) or Straume (2006) for more detailed explanations. Horn and
Persson (2001) generalises the equilibrium coalition structure to n player.
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the coalition cannot be broken by an offer from an outsider, and that the partners
would enter the coalition voluntarily given the status quo represented by the initial
situation. In this section we nd the main result of the paper:
Proposition 6 i) When considering two-rm coalitions only, the endogenously
determined equilibrium technology sharing coalition consists of the two most ef-
cient rms entering into a coalition. ii) If allowing for a three-rm coalition, then
the endogenously determined equilibrium coalition comprises all three rms only
when the ex ante marginal cost, c, is sufciently low. If c is above this threshold,
then the coalition comprising the two most efcient rms is the equilibrium coali-
tion.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
Figure 2 delineates the parameter values that are consistent with the two equi-
librium coalition structures. For parameter values between lines A and H, the
three-rm coalition C123 dominates all other coalitions, whereas between lines B
and H the two-rm coalition comprising rms 1 and 2, C12, dominates.20 When
ex ante marginal costs are low, the potential for innovation is limited. In such
a situation the investing rms realise that it makes sense to invest less than in a
situation where the potential for innovation is greater. The coalition structure that
implies the lowest overall R&D is the three-rm coalition. The investment level of
each individual rm is unambiguously lower for rms 1 and 2, but not necessarily
for rm 3. The perfect spillover of R&D between rms implies that this structure
achieves a given reduction in marginal production cost with the lowest effort.
The idea behind the equilibrium concept utilised here is that no single rm or
coalition of rms can break up the coalition, and each of the rms within the coali-
tion is at least as well of within the coalition as being outsiders. The incentive to be
an outsider to a merger is well known in the literature, with seminal contributions
from Stiegler (1950), Farrell and Shapiro (1990) under Cournot competition, and
Deneckere and Davidson (1985) with Bertrand competition. With Cournot com-
petition, outsiders tend to prot more from a merger than insiders if there are no
20In Figure 2, we have used Ch to indicate that the coalition of type h forms delineated by
different cases.
www.economics-ejournal.org 27
conomics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal
synergy effects. The seminal contribution is Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983).
With sufcient synergy effects prices might fall, but the contraction in output by
the insiders will always trigger an increase in the output by the outsider(s) which
on its own is a benet for the outsiders. Although we do not consider mergers
in the product market in the present analysis, an RJV coalition yields efciency
(synergy) effects in the product market. In the present analysis the coalition part-
ners are at least as well of within the coalition as outside and the market share
of the coalition partners increases vis a vis the no coalition case due to signic-
ant efciency effects, which is similar to Farrell and Shapiro (1990) with synergy
effects. The overall effect of the equilibrium coalition is to reduce price. Con-
sequently, the R&D coalition both increases production efciency and results in
a lower price, which leads us to conclude that consumers are also better off with
than without this coalition.
From Figure 2 it is also apparent that the level of the ex ante marginal cost, c,
plays an important role when determining which of the coalitions that will emerge
in equilibrium. The parameter c is also a measure of the degree of asymmetry
between rms, and we observe that for a low degree of asymmetry (low c) the
equilibrium coalition is the grand coalition, whereas with high degree of asym-
metry the equilibrium coalition is the coalition of the two most efcient rms.
Contrary to the result in Röller et al. (2007), industry prot is not necessarily
lower with the formation of a technology sharing coalition. The equilibrium co-
alition only emerges if this is a more benecial arrangement for all partners than
the best alternative arrangement.
9 Welfare Comparison and Discussion
The outcome of a process of endogenous coalition formation has been shown to
be technology sharing either between the two most efcient rms, or between all
three rms. We now consider the effects that this will have on the product market
equilibrium and consumer surplus in this market.
We have shown above that of the coalition outcomes involving two partners,
the industry prot is highest when the two most efcient rms enter into a tech-
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Coalition Structures and Welfare Comparison
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nology sharing consortium, with Π12 being strictly larger than Π13 and Π23 (see
(23) and (24) in Appendix 2). It can also be shown that the industry prot without
coalitions is strictly lower than the equilibrium coalition, since Π12 > Π where
Π = Π1+Π2+Π3 represents the non-cooperative case. Furthermore, it can be
shown that Π23 > Π, but Π13 may be either higher or lower than Π. However, if
(22) in Appendix 2 is violated with c< ec, then we know thatΠ12>Π13>Π23>Π
with industry prot in the equilibrium coalition being the highest of the potential
outcomes considered.





the following ranking (for all c and γ):
CS12 >CS13 >CS23 >CS=CS123
Consequently, when c< ec (this is the area between lines K and A in Figure 2)
the ranking of welfare is given by :
W 12 >W 13 >W 23 >W
whereW i j CSi j+Πi j.21 If considering the three-rm coalition it can be shown
that for low ex antemarginal costs it becomes more likely that welfare in the three-
rm coalition is higher than the best alternative (the coalition between rms 1 and
2) as γ increases (see Figure 2; for parameter values between lines A and J we
have W 123 >W 12). When c > ec, welfare is highest when the two most efcient
rms are allowed to share technology advancements, since consumers value this
coalition highest and the industry prot in this coalition is highest;W 12 >W , and
it is also easily shown thatW 23 >W . A complete welfare ranking in this case will
be parameter specic. This is summed up in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 i) Consumers prefer a coalition between the two ex ante most
efcient rms to any other arrangement: CS12 >CS13 >CS23 >CS =CS123. ii)
When the proportionality parameter c is below a threshold level ec, the ranking in
terms of welfare is identical to the consumers' surplus ranking. iii) For the three-
rm coalition, the free-riding effect dominates the technology advancement effect,
21In Figure 2,W h indicates that it is coalition h that maximizes welfare in each delineated area.
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and consumers are indifferent between a grand coalition and no coalition with
CS =CS123. iv) For sufciently low ex ante costs and sufciently high investment
cost, W 123 >W 12.
In the context of the present model, we observe that there are no conicting
interests between consumers and rms in terms of which two-rm coalition out-
come is preferred provided that the ex ante difference between rms, c, satises
c< ec. However, when ex ante marginal cost becomes sufciently low and γ suf-
ciently large, then rms and consumers have conicting interests. The three-rm
coalition is the least preferred coalition for consumers, but rms prefer this solu-
tion when the potential for innovation is limited and the cost of investment high.
In such a situation the resulting market output is lower than all two-rm coalitions
to the detriment of consumers, but the savings in terms of lower cost of invest-
ment for rms outweighs the reduction in consumers' surplus. The result of no
conict when comparing all two-rm coalitions is, perhaps, surprising since one
hypothesis might be that higher levels of R&D lead to higher consumers' surplus
and welfare, and we know that the total level of R&D is in fact lowest with a
coalition between rms 1 and 2. The ranking is a consequence of total output
being Q12 > Q13 > Q23 > Q= Q123 which is inversely related to total R&D. The
difference between total output in the three potential coalition outcomes is pro-
portional to the parameters c and γ , with Q12 Q13 = γc and Q13 Q23 = γc. We
need to look at other factors to explain why consumers (together with rms and
welfare maximizing authorities) prefer the outcome with the lowest level of R&D
expenditure. The possible conict between the coalition structure that maximizes
welfare, and the coalition that will arise endogenously is outlined in Figure 2 as
the area between curves H and J.
In Figure 2, we see a demonstration of the point made by Belleamme (2000)
that the grand coalition will not necessarily arise when rms are asymmetric. In
our analysis, it may arise for some parameter values, and for a smaller set of values
it will also be welfare optimal.
As is discussed above we know from Bergstrom and Varian (1985) that the
Nash outcome of a class of games will be independent of the distribution of the
rms' characteristics, and that it is not the total R&D effort that matters but the ef-
fective reduction in the sum of marginal costs resulting from R&D. In the present
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analysis with perfect spillovers within the coalition, the effective reduction in mar-
ginal costs will depend on whether there is a coalition and which rms enter into
the coalition. The effective reduction in the case of no coalition is simply given
by total R&D, X , and 2





+ xi jk in the case of a coalition between rms
i and j, where rm k is the outsider. It can easily be shown that the effective
reduction in the sum of marginal costs is highest when rms 1 and 2 enter into
a coalition, and that the rest of the potential outcomes conrms the consumers'
surplus ranking. Consequently, even if the total level of R&D is lower in all of
the three potential coalitions the fact that each unit of R&D undertaken by the
coalition partners effectively counts twice.
10 Antitrust Policy and Research Joint Ventures
Article 81 of the EC Treaty states that all agreements between undertakings that
may affect trade between member countries, and which may distort, restrict or
prevent competition within the common market is prohibited. There are excep-
tions, notably in terms of block exemptions, for practices that are deemed to be
desirable. These are practices "...which contributes to improving the production
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic progress, while
allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benet" (Article 81(3) of the
Treaty). The block exemptions come with conditions attached, and should not
impose restrictions on the cooperation partners that are not indispensable to the
attainment of the objectives (Article 81(3a)), and should not put the partners in a
position to be able to eliminate competition "for a substantial part of the products
in question" (Article 81(3b)). In the U.S., the National Cooperative Research Act
of 1984 enables rms to participate in joint research and development ventures.
Relevant to the present analysis is the Commission Regulation (EC) No
2659/2000 of 29th November 2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the
Treaty to categories of research and development agreements. In paragraph (14)
of this regulation it is stated that "..to justify the exemption, the joint exploitation
should relate to product and processes for which the use of the results of the re-
search and development is decisive, and each of the parties is given the opportunity
of exploiting any results that interest it". The implication of this is that the R&D
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undertaken affects either the product or the (production) processes, which would
not have happened in the absence of the cooperative effort. The other implication
is that the development of new processes, which may result in, e.g., lower produc-
tion costs, should be allowed to be utilised by any of the parties to the cooperation.
Put differently, if the outcome of the cooperation is successful, the benet intro-
duces a spillover effect on either (production) costs or product attributes. This is
of importance to our analysis, since we assume that there is spillover from the
R&D process to production costs.
To ensure that the block exemption does not hinder effective competition,
there is a market share limitation on the partners' combined market share in the
market for products arising from the joint research and development cooperation.
The market share restriction (and restrictions on the length of the exemption) is
specied in Commission Regulation No 2659/2000, Article 4. If the participating
rms are competitors, the exemption requires that the combined market share of
the partners does not exceed 25% in the relevant market. However, a market share
of more than 25% does not necessarily imply an infringement of Article 81(1),
and a research and development joint venture with a larger market share may still
pass the examination of competition authorities. Imposing such a requirement to
exempt the coalition from antitrust action can be seen as an extra restriction on the
optimisation problem. We will discuss the effect of a restriction on market shares
briey below, without formally incorporating such a constraint in the optimisation
problem.
In the setting of our model with only three active rms, it is naturally unlikely
that this constraint can be met in many of the coalitions we consider. The market
shares for each of the three rms, si for i= 1;2;3, operating as independent rms
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where both s1 and s2 are increasing functions of c, whereas s3 is a decreasing
function of c. When all three rms are symmetric (c = 0) they each have a mar-
ket share of 1=3. Taking into account the equilibrium cost reducing investments
for the three rms operating independently shows a similar picture. Naturally,
the grand coalition will be ruled out by the market share restriction. Investigat-
ing the market share of the three two-rm coalitions, there is only one coalition
that appears to be close to be within the market share restriction posed by Com-
mission Regulation No 2659/2000. The coalition between the two most efcient
rms, which is one of the two equilibrium coalition structures that emerge, has a
minimum market share of 2=3 and is increasing in c and decreasing in γ . Con-
sequently, the antitrust guidelines for cooperative research and development in the
EU indicate that the two equilibrium structures will be prohibited, or will at least
not fall within the block exemption. Since the coalition between the two most
efcient rms is the preferred coalition, both as seen from an industry, consumer
surplus and welfare maximising perspective, the guidelines do not appear to im-
prove welfare. The only coalition that comes close to satisfying the market share
restrictions, is the coalition between the two least efcient rms, although for the
parameter space we consider (c> c> c, and γ > 5) the market share of this coali-
tion will exceed 25%, but may be below 30%. If the degree of asymmetry between
the rms is large, i.e., c is large, and the cost of undertaking cost reducing R&D
investments is sufciently high, then the market share of the coalition between
rms 2 and 3 may come close to the 25% market share requirement.
11 A Case Study: Aircraft Engine Manufacturing
In the manufacturing of aircraft engines for medium narrowbody (Boeing B737-
series, Airbus A320-series) and widebody aircraft (A330/340, A380, B767, B777,
B747), there are three rms that dominate the market. The three rms are General
Electric Aviation (GE), Pratt-Whitney (PW), and Rolls-Royce (RR). These rms
operate both as independent manufacturers, and (to varying degrees) as part of
joint ventures. We do not have access to ofcial data on engine deliveries, but
based on a rough estimate of engine deliveries based on delivery data for narrow-
body and widebody jets for Boeing and Airbus for 2008 the market shares for
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these three producers are:22 GE 67%, RR 19%, and PW 14%. Some of these
aircraft are tted with an engine that is a result of a joint venture between GE and
Snecma (CFM-engines that power Boeing B737-models, and approximately 50%
of Airbus A320-models). Snecma is not a stand-alone producer, and following
EU Commission's analysis for the proposed GE/Honeywell-merger CFM-engines
are characterised as GE products for market share purposes.23 Similarly, a joint
venture between RR and PW (and others) produces an alternative engine for the
Airbus A320-series, the IAE2500. The market share of IAE is split 50-50 between
RR and PW. In addition to market shares for new deliveries, it would be bene-
cial to have market share information on installed base of engines. Due to engine
commonality, there are benets for airlines of operating with similar engine types.
This is information that we do not have access to, but Giotakos et al. (2001) refer
to GE as being by far the largest both in terms of installed base and order backlogs
for large commercial aircraft, and that GE has experienced the highest growth in
installed base.
We do not have access to cost or price data for engines, but it is reasonable to
expect that there are at least some degree of both economies of scale and scope
in engine production. Engine commonality, in addition to benets for the air-
lines, implies that innovations made in one engine can be utilised in other engines
which has implications for the production cost for the engine manufacturers. Con-
sequently, it may be reasonable to expect that a large producer, both in terms of
large market share within a single engine category and through a number of en-
gine variants, enjoys a cost advantage. In our model, such cost asymmetry is an
important feature.
Since engines powering narrowbody and widebody aircraft are not necessar-
ily identical, let us consider splitting market share data into the two categories
narrowbody and widebody (2008 deliveries): GE has approximately 70% of the
narrowbody market (through CFM), whereas IAE takes the remaining 30% (i.e.,
15% of the narrowbody market for RR and 15% for PW). For widebody, GE on its
own products has approximately 53% of the market (mostly GE90 and CF6), RR
around 32% (mostly Trent 500, 700 and 900), PW around 12% (PW4000), CFM
22Source: www.airliners.net.
23See, e.g., Giotakos et al. (2001).
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around 2% (joint venture between GE and Snecma) and Engine Alliance (joint
venture between GE and PW) around 1%. Consequently, for widebody aircraft
the three major engine manufacturers produce both a product on their own, and
two of the three also as part of a joint venture with one of the other manufacturers.
In addition to the economies of scale and scope argument, Giotakos et al. (2001)
argue that GE, due to its substantial involvement in the nancial service sector, is
in a position to increase rivals' funding costs through the use of huge discounts
when selling in the engine. To be able to match such discounts, rival rms must
rely more on external nancing than GE which may increase both borrowing cost
and the risk that rivals face.
In 1996, two of the three main engine manufacturers, GE and PW, formed the
Engine Alliance (EA), and were in 1999 granted exemption from Article 81 of
the EC Treaty.24 The aim was to produce a new engine for the stretched version
of the Boeing 747 which eventually did not materialise, and then subsequently
to provide engines for the Airbus' A380-program. The major competitor to the
engine developed by EA is manufactured by the third main engine manufacturer,
Rolls-Royce (RR Trent 900). Although both GE and PW are fully capable of
manufacturing fully functional engines, they intended to combine their comple-
mentary technologies.25 The GP7200 engine developed by GE and PW combines
low pressure turbine and compressor from PW, with high pressure turbine and
compressor from GE. Consequently, the effort of the two joint venture partners
are complementary. The agreement between the two companies specify that any
technology developed in the course this particular engine programme can be used
in any other engine programme. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the joint
venture between GE and PW may yield efciency gains also for other engine pro-
grammes.
Although we cannot identify cost asymmetries in the production of aircraft
engines between the three producers, it is reasonable to expect some degree of
asymmetry due to the size difference between the major manufacturers. So we
have three asymmetric rms, at least two different joint ventures in the develop-
24See Commission Decision of 14 September 1999 relating to a proceeding pursuant to Article
81 of the EC Treaty (Case IV/36.213/F2 - GEAE/P&W). The exemption is until 26 September 2011.
25See paragraph (71) in Commission Decision of 14 September 1999 relating to a proceeding
pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty (Case IV/36.213/F2 - GEAE/P&W).
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ment and manufacturing of widebody aircraft engines with subsequent (potential)
spillovers to other engine programmes. From the analysis above, we predict as
the equilibrium outcome either a joint venture between all three rms (the grand
coalition) or between the two most efcient rms. If we take market share as
an indication of efciency (e.g., due to economies of scale and scope), GE is the
most efcient rm, then RR, and nally PW. Our theoretical model consequently
predicts either all rms, or GE and RR, form a joint venture. This is not some-
thing we observe. However, from the section above we have also learnt that the
exemption from Article 81 in the EC Treaty for R&D cooperation puts restrictions
on market share for the partners. In the widebody market, GE and RR are by far
the two dominant rms with a total market share of around 85% with engines pro-
duced solely by GE and RR, respectively. Consequently, it is very unlikely that
antitrust exemption would be granted for a research joint venture between these
two rms. A joint venture between GE and PW would command a market share
for widebody engines of around 65%, which is also above the threshold level of
25%. What should be noted is that the 25% threshold level is applicable for block
exemption, and a joint venture with larger market share may be approved if it is
deemed not to infringe Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty. In this case, allowing the
EA joint venture facilitated the development and production of the only alternative
to the RR engine for the A380-series.
Circumstantial evidence, based on a comparison of market shares in aircraft
engine manufacturing, indicates that the proposed solutions from the theoretical
model seem not to be implementable. It is likely that this is mainly due to a
concern that allowing GE and RR to form a joint venture could have a too large
negative effect on competition, and would essentially monopolise the market for
engines suitable for very large widebody aircraft. Although the third rm, PW,
currently offers an engine option for the B747-400 which is the closest aircraft
to the A380 in terms of passenger capacity, the next generation B747 will not be
offered with a PW engine option. PW would then be out of this market segment.
Although not the same size as the A380, the largest version of the A340 (the
A340-600) is comparable in passenger capacity to the B747-400, and is powered
by RR Trent 500 engines. Thus, PW seems to become a minor player in the market
for large widebody aircraft in the future without the involvement with GE in the
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Engine Alliance. It is not unlikely that this played an important role in granting
the joint venture between GE and PW exemption from Article 81 in the EC Treaty.
12 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have addressed the issue of cooperation in R&D strategy between
heterogeneous rms by allowing endogenous technology sharing. Neither hetero-
geneity between rms nor endogenous cooperation structures have been fully ex-
plored in the R&D literature. To facilitate this analysis we have thus had to limit
the analysis to a particular kind of asymmetry between the rms. Nevertheless,
the results are indicative of the sort of pitfalls that can be faced by industrial policy
makers in attempting to reach and ambitious R&D target. In our model, when the
two most efcient rms join together and share technological breakthroughs, it
is not possible for the outsider to offer either of the partners a better deal when
considering only two-rm coalitions. In addition the partners prefer sharing their
technology over the initial non-cooperative situation. Hence this is one of the two
technology sharing agreement that will be predicted to arise endogenously. For
sufciently low ex ante marginal cost, the three-rm coalition will dominate all
other coalitions and will emerge as the equilibrium structure. Moreover, we have
shown that when the coalition between the two most efcient rms is the equilib-
rium, this agreement also maximizes the total welfare in society. The three-rm
coalition may emerge as the equilibrium structure, but will for certain parameter
combinations be welfare sub-optimal. Both these structures that may arise in equi-
librium give the overall lowest amount of R&D. However, as is pointed out above
it is not necessarily the total amount of R&D that is of importance when ascertain-
ing the welfare effect of a particular coalition, but the distribution of R&D effort
across rms.
The only commitment a coalition makes is to share technology improvements
with the other coalition members, and there is no coordination of R&D efforts by
the rms. Consequently, the issue we analyse is a pure technology sharing agree-
ment rather than R&D cooperation per se. Our approach is identical to the ap-
proach coined "RJV competition" in Kamien, Muller and Zang (1992). Although
not representative for all types of R&D cooperation, we argue that our approach is
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compatible with a number of technology sharing arrangements, among them the
aircraft engine manufacturing example provided in the paper.
In the present analysis, technology sharing affects variable costs. If techno-
logy sharing were to affect xed costs, this would have potential impact through
at least two different channels. First, xed costs would affect entry/exit decisions
by rms. Since we consider only equilibria in which all three rms are active
this is not an issue here. Second, changes to xed costs will affect the difference
in insider and outsider prots. This may affect the incentives for the outsider to
break an existing coalition by offering one of the coalition partners a more attract-
ive deal. However, the cost savings from entering into a coalition in our approach
also affects the difference between outsider and insider prots (and the incent-
ives to break the coalition). Since the endogenously chosen coalition is one which
yields the highest industry prot, the result from our approach is likely to be (qual-
itatively) similar to a setting where coalitions affect xed costs. Horn & Persson
(2001) state that with xed cost savings the set of equilibrium coalitions are the
structures with minimal industry cost.
In the above analysis, we have implicitly assumed that all rms are equally
capable of utilising the technology advancements. It is not unreasonable to as-
sume that the absorptive capacity of rms may differ, and the degree of absorption
of technology improvements may depend on the initial technology. This initial
technology may, of course, be the result of an endogenous choice. Differences in
absorptive capacity may be reected through rm specic and imperfect spillover
parameters.
In terms of the welfare ranking of the outcomes, we have seen that the virtue
of perfect spillover is to add additional benet to a coalition by in essence double
the impact of any R&D undertaken by rms in a coalition. If the coalition partners
enjoy less than perfect spillovers, then the results with respect to the welfare rank-
ing could be changed. In addition, free-riding becomes less of a problem. This
is, in particular, the case with spillovers close to zero. In such a case, the value
for society in terms of added consumers' surplus of allowing a coalition is low.
Nevertheless, if the coalition is costless for a participating rm it may still choose
to agree to such a coalition even with very low spillovers, provided that the cost
advantage of the rm over its rivals is not deteriorated.
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Our analysis is restricted to only three rms, which rules out more fragmented
situations than a triopoly. In this respect, the present analysis represents highly
concentrated industries, such as our aircraft engine manufacturing example. In
less concentrated industries, there might be more than one decisive group which
may have an impact on the analysis of the equilibrium coalition structure, and it
is thus reasonable to expect that the results will not be as strong. This is acknow-
ledged in Horn & Persson (2001), in which they state that it is difcult to derive
results as strong as those in Propositions 1 and 2 for less concentrated structures,
because of the intransitivity of the dominance relation. Furthermore, our solution
concept for the endogenous coalition follows the strand of literature which allows
potential partners to communicate freely and to sign binding contracts. In the al-
ternative, non-cooperative bargaining approaches, the outcome is often dependent
on the sequencing of decisions. We are of the opinion that the Horn & Persson
approach is a fairly accurate description of a number of technology sharing agree-
ments (e.g., the aircraft engine manufacturing example).
We have also examined the antitrust aspects of R&D cooperation, with an
emphasis on the market share restrictions that are put on such cooperative ar-
rangements in order for them to be part of the exemption to Article 81 of the EC
Treaty. The restriction states that the market share for products related to the R&D
cooperation shall not be larger than 25% when entering into the cooperation, and
since our model consists of three rms only it is highly likely that neither of the
potential coalitions will t the bill. However, without considering strategic re-
sponses to such a restriction it is possible to show that the coalition between the
two least efcient rms can at least come close to the 25% market share restric-
tion. Furthermore, a market share of more than 25% may be allowed provided
that competition is not restricted too adversely.
In highly concentrated industries, which is the case that we consider, competi-
tion policy authorities would generally be reluctant to allow too much cooperation
even though research & development collaborations are provided with a block ex-
emption from Article 81 in the EC Treaty. In particular, with a block exemption on
a R&D cooperation project it is unlikely that coordination of the production of the
nal product will be allowed. Another plausible sharing of technology inform-
ation is one which allows the partners to produce at the lowest cost technology
available. However, our concern is with a situation where not all technological
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knowledge is distributed to all coalition partners, which in our opinion is a highly
likely scenario. In such a case, the coalition partners are faced with their initial
cost of production, but they are able to obtain technological advances from the
partners, which reduce their production costs in some dimensions complementary
to a rm's own R&D effort.
One argument for coordinating R&D expenditures is to reduce socially waste-
ful R&D effort, which would provide an additional social gain from cooperation
(often due to elimination of xed costs of R&D). In the context of our analysis,
the cost of doing research involves a quadratic cost function, and the technology
advances are complementary. This implies that the eliminating R&D undertaken
by one rm does not necessarily imply a social benet. Furthermore, to achieve
the same total impact of the R&D another coalition partner would have to increase
its R&D spending if one rm reduces his spending. Due to the quadratic R&D
cost function this would imply higher total expenditure on R&D.
The manufacturing of aircraft engines provide a case study for the analysis,
and this example shows that different coalitions can form between the leading act-
ors in this industry. We do not, however, observe the coalitions predicted from the
theory since they may contravene competition law. Whilst we have shown that the
predicted technology sharing agreements can maximize welfare given the market
structure, the case study reveals that the weakening of potential competition may
be a factor in predicting actual sharing arrangements. For the aircraft manufac-
turing industry, however, RJVs may arguably not affect the possibility for other
rms to enter the market. The theoretical analysis then shows that allowing a re-
search coalition between the most efcient rms, or all leading rms, may well be
welfare improving. This paper has contributed to the theory of technology shar-
ing by looking at heterogeneous rms that all have different incentives to divulge
information in R&D joint ventures. Our ongoing research attempts to integrate
competition policy into this framework.
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Proof of Proposition 6:
Part (i): Dene ∆m Π12 Π13 and ∆n Π12 Π23, whereΠi j Πi j1 +Π
i j
2 +
Πi j3 is the industry prot with a coalition between rms i and j, for i; j = 1;2;3
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This implies that the industry prot is highest when rms 1 and 2, i.e., the
two most efcient rms, enter into a technology sharing consortium. In order
to obtain a complete ranking of all the three coalition outcomes, let us dene








The sign on equation (21) is ambiguous, but ∆r  0 if:
c ec γ2 (40γ 54)
(306γ (1+ γ2) 645γ2 54) (22)
If (22) holds, the ranking between industry prots for the three coalitions is:
Π12 >Π23 Π13  0 (23)
If (22) is violated, the ranking of industry prot is:
Π12 >Π13 Π23  0 (24)
To ensure that the coalition between rms 1 and 2 is the equilibrium techno-
logy sharing agreement, we need to ensure that rms 1 and 2 cannot earn higher

















We have already seen that the non-cooperative R&D levels are strictly higher for
rms 1 and 2, but the factor γ(2γ 1)2 is larger than
γ(8γ 9)
18 . To check that ∆s > 0
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rst note that as γ ! ∞;∆s! 0. The area in which the equilibria that underlie ∆s
exist is given by γ 26(γ 1)  c> c> c
2(2γ 3)
8γ2 17γ 3 which is the area between A and
B in Figure 1. Evaluating ∆s at a point on either of these lines reveals that ∆s > 0.
Furthermore, from this point we have that ∂∆s
∂γ
< 0 so that ∆s! 0 from above as γ
increases. Hence for parameter combinations of c and γ in the permissible range
we have ∆s > 0. Hence, we have shown part (i).
Part (ii): If we allow for all three rms to enter into a technology shar-
ing coalition, the three-rm coalition will emerge as the equilibrium structure
if Π123 Π12  0, which will be the case if c  d(γ) where d(γ) is dened in
the appendix. For the three-rm coalition, we need in addition to ensure that the
coalition prot is greater than, or equal, the prot in the default scenario of no co-
alition; i.e., Π123 Π 0. These two conditions are satised in the area between
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